Hamlet in His World: Shakespeare Anticipates/Assaults Cartesian Dualism by Demastes, William W.
Fall 2005                                                                                                             27
Hamlet in His World:
Shakespeare Anticipates/Assaults Cartesian Dualism
William W. Demastes
“There’s a divinity that shapes our ends” (V.ii.10), Hamlet concedes in the 
latter stages of Shakespeare’s masterpiece. It is an idea Hamlet more vividly and 
memorably repeats moments later:  “There is a special providence in the fall of a 
sparrow” (V.ii.207), followed immediately by the almost Bottom-esgue, “If it be 
now ’tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now; yet it 
will come. The readiness is all” (V.ii.208-211).
The fatalism of these ﬁfth-act words seems to reveal nothing less than a total 
mental capitulation of a man who, in the opening act, seems so determined to take 
the world in his hands and restructure, indeed remake, that world as he sees ﬁt. 
Despite his ﬁrst-act reluctance—“O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it 
right” (I.v.188-89)—Hamlet dives into an ethical, epistemological, and ontological 
cesspool seemingly fully equipped to reverse the pattern of decay and rot plaguing 
Denmark. Bolstered by a library of modern ideas, Hamlet allows his mind the free 
play to step out from the shadows of the Middle Ages and bask in the Copernican 
sun of unlimited human potential. But by play’s end, Hamlet is a mere shadow of 
his former grand self. A man who seemed to be a colossus looming over his domain 
is reduced to humbly comparing his lot to that of a lowly sparrow.
So is this, as Ophelia prematurely notes in Act III, the tale of “a noble mind . . . 
o’erthrown” (III.i.150)? Are we seeing a “noble and sweet reason, like sweet 
bells jangled, out of time and harsh, blasted with [the] ecstasy [of madness]” (III.
i.157-60)? To my mind, Hamlet’s story is centrally one of a precipitous rise and 
almost immediate revision of a dualistically fabricated renaissance mind. It is not 
a “fall” from, say, a grandly idealist and vital sense of universal human dominion 
to a reductively realist and mechanistic alternative worthy of heroically rejecting 
as beneath human nature to accept (so “like an angel” and “how like a god” [II.
ii.302, 304]). Such a rejection would be a quaint, anachronistic, and rather appealing 
sort of Byronic romanticism, but it’s not Hamlet. Struggling with the limits of his 
dualistic presumptions and idealistic inclinations, Hamlet is initially repulsed by 
what he increasingly sees to be the triumph of the material/physical alternative 
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in this realist versus idealist either/or universe. But what eventually occurs is 
a much more complex, maddening, and disorienting implosion of an illusory 
vision of a dichotomous world order—a struggle between ideal/immaterial and 
physical/material realities—coming together to suggest a new paradigm altogether. 
Ultimately, through the fog of apparent madness, Hamlet’s mind wraps around an 
integrationist, monist idea that the ideal and real dissolve as concepts in ways that 
were undreamt of in his previous philosophy. And we see that the theatre, of all 
places, is the best of all worlds for this turn of events to occur.
Remember that Shakespeare lived from 1564 to 1616, and Hamlet was ﬁrst 
performed in 1601, times of religiously grounded philosophical turmoil of all sorts. 
One of the key elements of religious debate hovered around the physical/spiritual 
dichotomy encapsulated in the matter of religious iconography of the time. As 
Jonas Barish has observed:
The Wycliffe preacher in the fourteenth century may have 
grudgingly conceded the pedagogical usefulness of church 
images. His successors [i.e., the Puritans] will make no such 
concessions. [These successors were living in] a day when 
monasteries had been dispossessed and despoiled throughout 
England, when statues and stained glass had been smashed with 
iconoclastic fury. . . . 1 
Underlying the rising Puritan iconoclasm of Shakespeare’s time is the charge that 
truth, the real, the beautiful are ideals that transcend the contingent corporeality 
of the merely physical. Religious icons may have had pedagogical value among 
a generally illiterate early Roman Catholic populace, but their iconic truth was at 
best a pitiful shadow of that which true Christianity was holding up as real and 
true. A church could be built with stone, but The Church was built of truer “stuff” 
beyond the physically real. 
Disturbing secular conﬁrmations of how deviously the physical can be 
manipulated against the idealized true were systematized and presented to maximum 
positive effect by Machiavelli (The Prince) and Castiglione (The Book of the 
Courtier), among numerous others. The quality of seeming to be true/real that 
the physical could so easily assume could cloak the strictly being qualities of the 
ideal in ways that conﬁrmed that seeming and being (the physical and its ideal/true 
correlative) could virtually never be trusted to coincide. 
Hamlet, however, is not put off by any dualistic confusions or attendant 
depression. At least early on, he dons the unadorned black garb of a Puritan 
iconoclast and declares an independence from the illusory world of materialist 
seeming, scofﬁng at the very idea of seeming introduced by a troubled and confused 
Gertrude (“Why seems it so particular with thee?” [1.2.75]). He even proclaims, in 
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the process, a desire that his “too, too solid ﬂesh would melt, / Thaw, and resolve 
itself into a dew” (I.ii.129-30). Trapped by the putrifying inescapability of his ﬂesh, 
Hamlet is clearly a man who prefers the ideal life of the mind found in Wittenberg 
to the carnal intrigues of Elsinore. So it’s no surprise that he curses his “fate,” the 
depressing point that he’s been born to set this corruptible physical world right.
If any idealist can remain uncorrupted by the physical world, it should be 
Hamlet, possessed as he is of virtually every virtue available to humankind. Aware 
of dualist traps set out against arrogant humanity, he catalogues for us a list of 
human affectations and then notes that “These indeed seem, / For they are actions 
that a man might play, / But I have that within which passeth show” (I.ii.83-85). 
Neither a Machiavelli nor a Castiglione (though aware of their tantalizing snares), 
Hamlet asserts that he is what he seems to be, no more, no less. So the line is clear 
and unambiguous in Hamlet’s mind:  dualism is incontrovertible, the physical/
material world is little more than a poor shadow of the Platonically ideal real (or 
the Christian truth), and seeming and being are easily distinguished by a shrewdly 
trained mind such as Hamlet possesses. Hamlet is a man who knows the difference 
and can operate, if necessary (and quite reluctantly), in both worlds, calling his 
ideal mind to grapple with and ultimately unmask the material world around it. He 
prefers the ideal but feels more than adequately equipped to wade through the too, 
too solid world of the physical if need be. This, at least, is where Hamlet stands 
at play’s beginning.
As the play unfolds, however, it becomes clear that it is nearly impossible 
to distinguish between seeming and being, despite Hamlet’s claims to know the 
difference. That seeming can mask being is no real surprise. Those are the insights 
of Machiavelli and Castiglione. Of moderate surprise, however, may be that Hamlet 
claims he can keep the two straight as he negotiates his way through Elsinore. This 
sort of arrogance will, of course, come back to haunt him. But more complicated 
is Hamlet’s reluctance to come to terms with a crucial point of the play, namely 
that seeming can actually alter being, as, presumably, acting mad can lead to being 
mad. He clearly initially rejects any notion that adopting a certain seeming behavior 
can in any notable fashion affect being itself. As Hamlet moves through Elsinore, 
seemingly in control of his outward behavior, questions begin to arise that even he 
seems incapable of answering with any certainty. Put another way, Hamlet’s actions 
and the play in general, at ﬁrst, support the standard iconoclastic concerns that the 
material/real does not coincide with its ideal/true correlatives. The physical world 
is not to be trusted to reveal anything of certainty about the ideal/true world. This 
amounts to a simple conﬁrmation of what Jonas Barish fully documents in The 
Antitheatrical Prejudice, namely theatre’s lesson that the physical world’s ability to 
be somehow different from that which it manifests/represents (“What’s Hecuba to 
him [the Player], or he to Hecuba?” [III.ii.543]) is indeed cause for epistemological, 
ontological, and metaphysical concern—even if Hamlet (if no one else) can tell 
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the difference. But can Hamlet really tell the difference? Distinguishing between 
claims and actions, can Hamlet really/truly answer the following (just to list a few 
disturbing questions):  Does he love or hate Ophelia? Does he or does he not want 
to avenge his father’s murder? Does he love Gertrude? Does he have any true 
friends in Elsinore, or elsewhere? The truth, of course, is cloaked in ambivalence 
and contradictory signs, but it is by no means unfathomable.
In their efforts to deal with this chasm between seeming and being, the era’s 
religious iconoclasm, courtly behaviorism, and abounding theatrical metaphors 
all ultimately lead to the rigorous early modern mind of a near contemporary of 
Shakespeare’s, René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes’s rigid formulation of a 
hierarchical dualism has, to this day, left a chasm between the physical and non-
physical that religion refuses to bridge in favor of the non-physical, and natural 
philosophy (science) leaves gaping as it stands on the side of the physical. Hamlet 
(though not Shakespeare) clearly anticipates Descartes (an articulator of a zeitgeist, 
apparently, rather than a philosophical singularity), and, much like Descartes, the 
early Hamlet clearly favors the ideal world of mind over the physical world of 
body. 
Hamlet is a mind caught up in the intellectual advances of his day articulating 
a dilemma on stage that ﬁnds its way into Descartes’s eventual “cogito” musings 
several years later. I see Hamlet’s dilemma in many ways unravel in much the same 
way Descartes’s “cogito” argument unravels, though its dualistic staying power 
remains remarkable even to this day. Terry Eagleton, in his far-reaching study on 
tragedy, observes that Descartes’s apparent big-bang breakthrough reveals nothing 
short of a “mind already thinking and possessed of an idea of the deity.”2 In other 
words, the mind predates the world around it, including the body in which it is 
housed. It is of stuff other than that world. And from that declaration of separateness, 
again according to Eagleton, “To possess the world conceptually thus means to 
lose it sensuously, grasping little more than an odourless, colourless spectre of the 
real thing.”3 According to Descartes, and according to the early Hamlet as well, the 
physical and the non-physical are two different sorts of things, physical existence 
being subordinate to the non-physical ideal, if the physical can even be trusted to 
exist at all. Being is ideal; the physical is seeming, in the best of circumstances 
only apparently real. 
I have always liked Samuel Johnson’s refutation of idealism and its dualist 
premises by simply kicking the rock in front of him. Such a pragmatist can only 
argue what is to him obvious:  the physical world clearly exists despite sophistic 
claims to the contrary. But, then, ideas come from somewhere. Is there, therefore, 
another realm that must be explored? Are the physical and the ideal of different 
origin, or at least of different ingredient? The dualists, of course, believe so. Body 
and idea of body are clearly different “stuff.” Here is where I see Descartes’s 
tantalizing thesis—one that has ensnared Western culture for centuries—begin to 
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crumble. And Hamlet’s foundational beliefs begin to crack under the pressure of 
such scrutiny as well. 
Here, in fact, is where Shakespeare himself kicks a stone to demonstrate an 
incipient monist position (a denial of dualist premises). Or, more vividly, I should 
say that given his whole lifetime of kicking stones in the theatre—a profession 
dedicated to kicking stones—Shakespeare ﬁnally sticks a boulder before our eyes 
and has his main character stumble over it in plain view of the whole world to 
see. Too often, however, I think we fail to see that boulder, mired in our dualist 
prejudices as we are. And here is where we get to the theatre. 
The theatre uses concrete physicality to generate ideas. After all, even the 
spirit of a deceased relative like Hamlet’s father is present in the ﬂesh (appearing 
in “warlike form” [I.i.51]), a perhaps distant reminder that early Greek and Judeo-
Christian thought believed (like the Egyptians, too) that the body was inseparable 
from self-hood and would go “with us” to our ﬁnal destinations in the afterworld. 
Ideas in the theatre do not exist without physical correlatives, and, from that point, 
one could argue neither do ideas in the (apparently illusory/theatrical) world exist 
without physical correlatives. Shakespeare presents a Hamlet who ultimately/
eventually sees exactly how his mind has run before his body to unsupportable 
conclusions. Deceived by sophisticated dualistic abstractions claiming the primacy 
of the mind over the body and the ideal over the real, Hamlet (catching up to 
Shakespeare himself) evolves, not from an idealist into a realist but actually into 
a person who dissolves the realist/idealist distinction and becomes a monist in his 
way of thinking about the world. The idealism gleaned during his otherworldly days 
surrounded by books and ideas in Wittenberg is challenged by the high theatricality 
of Elsinore court life (not to mention the interest/infatuation in/with the theatre he 
brings with him, apparently from Wittenberg). It is not a recognition that the physical 
is more real than the ideal, but that the real and the ideal are in fact inseparable. 
Sorting out the problem of seeming and being—though of considerable pragmatic 
concern—is merely a matter of perception (a sort of detective’s job of deciphering 
events) rather than inhering in the mind-boggling metaphysical and ontological 
concerns of his earlier dualist musings. 
Being sane is different from appearing sane but being mad (and vice versa), 
which is different from simply being mad. When Hamlet appears to be mad, he 
has not ingeniously hacked a gap between being and appearing; rather, he has 
introduced to us a separate category of being someone who appears to be mad. 
Admittedly, it is difﬁcult to distinguish between being someone who appears to 
be mad and being someone who is mad. But the distinction does not beg for an 
invocation of dual—physical and ideal—realities. It does not suggest that we throw 
up our hands and look beyond the physical for truth. Rather, it speaks to a need to 
sharpen our tools of discernment. And when those reﬁned tools truly fail to fathom 
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truth, then perhaps the question—is Hamlet mad or not, for example—genuinely 
has no answer, even in the ideal. 
This change in perspective seems to begin following Hamlet’s aborted 
trip to England when Hamlet returns to Elsinore, a body literally affected by 
its physically inescapable attraction to Denmark against the will of Hamlet’s 
idealist, escapist desires. That failed attempt physically to will his body to leave 
the gravitational attraction of the all-too-physical Elsinore marks the point where 
Hamlet intellectually becomes a different man, one who sees the physical world as 
more gravely real than before. More speciﬁcally, until this signal event, this literal 
sea change, Hamlet had virtually completely disregarded the signiﬁcance of the 
physical realities of the world about him, hardly even grieving over the irreversible 
physical destruction of his father and Polonius, nor feeling any remorse over the 
cruelty of his behavior to those around him. Recall that he could care less for the 
body of the murdered Polonius but is now (in Act V) prepared to grieve over the 
body of Ophelia. Bodies—in all their (un)seemly appearance—now matter. Until 
his return from the sea, he grieves over the loss of ideas/ideals like honor and virtue 
(manifest in his father’s perfunctory funeral and mother’s hasty marriage), but not 
for mere things of the ﬂesh. However, toward play’s end, despite all his earlier efforts 
to the contrary, he has come to realize that he and his mind are part of the physical 
world around him rather than beyond or outside or above that world. Dualism is 
itself the illusion that Hamlet’s odyssey in Elsinore (and beyond) unearths (literally 
reﬂected in the unearthing of poor Yorick’s skull) and then buries (in Ophelia’s 
earthy grave). Hamlet’s struggle no longer involves a debate between primacy of 
the physically real or the mentally ideal. That ideal world (contrasted against the 
merely physical) he thought could be bounded in a nutshell is neither better nor 
worse—nor even really different—than the world bounded by castle walls (though 
thinking may [erroneously] make it so). Rather, Hamlet comes to realize that the 
debate between the real and the ideal is itself an illusion (or delusion).
Consider this:  when Hamlet merely seems mad, his affect on others is much the 
same as if or when he in fact is mad. Hamlet’s seeming to hate Ophelia has the same 
affect as, in point of fact, hating her. But seeming is what happens in the physical 
world; being occurs in the ideal world. Right? Slippage between the two is supposed 
to reveal the superiority of the true ideal world over the physical. Hamlet and 
Shakespeare, however, reveal to us that seeming is actually little more than a level 
of description of commitment in the world of being rather than being’s opposite. It is 
itself a form of being, cutting every bit as sharply as if it were real. We do not have 
enough clear evidence to conclude whether Hamlet loves or hates Ophelia, but we 
can clearly see that the effect of his apparently feigned hatred/madness is every bit 
as fatal. What we see is that seeming and being may be signiﬁcant categories only 
in that the category of seeming mad is a category of physical reality that must be 
accepted exactly for what it is. Without evidence demonstrating actual madness, we 
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must accept that the appearance of madness is itself a viable descriptive category. It 
is itself a truth to be accepted and to be fathomed no further; we certainly need not 
appeal to some ideal alternative realm to ﬁnd some deeper truth. For all practical 
purposes, seeming mad is a categorical relative of actually being mad but no 
more. Simply put, the oppositionality previously assumed between seeming and 
being is itself the central human illusion—the illusion that leads to the delusion 
of idealistic dualism. I see Shakespeare suggesting a very real, very signiﬁcant 
relevance in seeming, and in seeming he sees a notable correspondence to being: 
Seeming mad is closely related to being mad. But this seeming is not something 
that invalidates the truth inherent in the physical world, and as such it does not 
invalidate the truth of physical reality paving the way for an idealist alternative; 
rather, it adds complexity in our efforts to comprehend that physically manifest real 
world. This complexity is signiﬁcant in our attempts to fathom truth, but no more. 
Clearly one can see Osric’s feigned sophistication. It is part of his personality, not 
an argument that his seeming to be sophisticated contradicts his being a simpleton. 
His appearance—a self-deceived buffoon—is what he really is.
In Agitated States:  Performance in the American Theater of Cruelty, Anthony 
Kubiak opens with a discussion of American Puritanism, where he draws in part 
from Robert K. Merton’s 1938 work on seventeenth-century England. Merton (and 
Kubiak) sees the otherworldly, idealistically entrenched Puritans actually bolstering 
“an emergent empiricist and pragmatic search for true causes” as they worked 
to understand the relationship between appearing and being, amid the doctrinal 
dilemma of determining whether one is saved or damned.4 They wanted to know 
the relationship between seeming and being, the actual correspondence between 
the two. Kubiak notes that the Puritans “were caught in the ontological binarism 
of authenticity/falseness and were not able to ﬁnd release in the rejection of the 
authentic and the tentative embrace of the mask.”5 Hamlet initially arrogantly strikes 
through the mask of his own Puritan doubt, relying on his powers of observation to 
bely the dilemma. But his early conﬁdence that he has “that within which passeth 
show” is ﬁrst undermined and, then, to an unforeseen but clearly ironic degree 
conﬁrmed toward play’s end. Hamlet moves from conﬁdently proclaiming that 
he can discern the difference between seeming and being in Act 1, to trying to 
demonstrate the difference through the middle of the play by his own controlled 
seeming behavior, to concluding in something of a confused, fatalistic, and nearly 
defeated fashion that seeming and being bleed into each other’s domains more fully 
than previously presumed. As will happen to the Puritans to follow him, dualism 
collapses in upon Hamlet leaving him without a foundation other than to accept 
the interrelating realistic idealism or idealistic realism of monism. Hamlet actually 
defeats dualism even before its great early-modern protagonist—Descartes—is 
able to articulate the thesis and then take sides. However uncomfortable it may be, 
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knowing the operation of the world outside the mind becomes a necessity if one 
is to comprehend the ideas harbored inside the mind.
Antonio Damasio, neuroscientist and author of Descartes’ Error:  Emotion, 
Reason, and the Human Brain, observes the evolutionary fact that “[i]f there had 
been no body, there would have been no brain,” and, by extension, without a brain 
there would have been no mind, and without mind there would be no ideas, much 
less a “world” that could be labeled ideal and somehow separate from the physical.6 
He continues:  “It is not only the separation between mind and brain that is mythical: 
the separation between mind and body is probably just as ﬁctional. The mind is 
embodied, in the full sense of the term, not just embrained.”7 The mental, spiritual, 
and metaphysical all derive from the physical. There are no two separate points 
of physical/non-physical genesis. They are parts of the same world and in many 
signiﬁcant ways inseparable from each other, despite our linguistic and sophistic 
expostulations to the contrary. It simply cannot be that seeming is not signiﬁcantly 
related to being, though admittedly such a connection is more complex when the 
subtleties related to a complex seeming/being dilemma actually arises (i.e., when 
someone tries to confuse the two). But this is a case of discernment (knowing how 
to distinguish between seeming and being), of epistemology (what we know), and 
not a case of ontology (what is). And running to dualist conclusions (leading to 
valorizing idealism) is not the solution because seeming and being are not opposites; 
they are terms of distinction and description applicable to the one physical world in 
which we live. That is Hamlet’s lesson. And that is where Shakespeare springs above 
and beyond Descartes as a singular thinker rather than an errant (but formidable) 
architect of a dualist universe, as Descartes has become for our culture.
Along these lines, one can see Hamlet’s father (the play’s original grounded 
man of action), in the belated form of a ghost (even the afterlife is inhabited by the 
physical), pursuing a sort of paternal mission to shake Hamlet out of his wayward, 
bookish, idealist leanings, pushing Hamlet to avenge his murder most foul in order 
to ground his son in the realities of the physical world around him. By leaving 
Gertrude out of the picture, the ghost strives precisely to avoid some Oresteian-style 
tragedy, hoping to protect Hamlet from a tragic end in order to preserve and convert 
his bookish son into something more like (and therefore more than) Fortinbras 
and Laertes, clearing a path for Hamlet to become king and forcing Hamlet to 
learn certain realities about the world around him, which will/should make him 
the stuff worthy of his birthright as king. Unfortunately, a tragic and sloppy body 
count does ensue despite the Ghost’s surgical efforts. But in its way, the Ghost’s 
plan works:  Hamlet is transformed by play’s end from bookish private citizen to a 
humbled and wordly-wise man capable of becoming a leader of his realm—though 
the possibility of reigning is almost immediately extinguished and given over to 
the lesser realist Fortinbras (in contrast to the early idealist Hamlet). Dualism is 
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momentarily defeated by an incipient monism, only to rise again from the other 
side of the delusional realist/dualist chasm.
But the play’s disastrous conclusion does not obliterate what Shakespeare has 
presented to his audience. Hamlet realizes at play’s end that, ﬁrst, he had really 
rather NOT have his too, too, solid ﬂesh melt, because that melting away would 
also dissolve his being. In fact, what appears to be of lasting value—spirit, soul, 
mind—may in fact not have an existence without ﬁrst (if not continually) having 
a physical reality. Neither in a realist’s nor idealist’s camp, Hamlet has belatedly 
come to understand something about the interwoven nature of the realist/idealist 
fabric of Reality itself, something the physical/spiritual presence of the Ghost—a 
spirit that physically walks the earth—actually embodies.
Here is the hub of my point:  evidence of an increasing number of current 
materialist scientists (of which Damasio is one)8—challenging a Cartesian/Puritan-
inspired tradition grounded in seventeenth-century thought—reveals increasingly 
persuasively that ineffable stuff like mind/consciousness/spirit/soul has evolved 
from materialist sources. Namely, primitive sensory accumulation devices arose in 
the most basic living organisms and evolved into more complex sensory gathering 
devices, which helped promote and preserve the species in possession of those tools. 
And in turn, greater sensory systems evolved until actual self-consciousness evolved 
as the ultimate self-preservation tool. That self-consciousness evolved through 
the body itself and into a brain that became capable of looking at itself and seeing 
itself as distinct from and ultimately (though mistakenly) superior to the world 
around it. Consciousness and mind are stuff of material reality. This concept of 
mind’s superiority over its environment is not the result, or even proof, of dualism 
but is an illusion (perhaps a survival tool) reﬁned from our own evolution in that 
environment. Damasio observes:  “Of late, the concept of mind has moved from 
the ethereal nowhere place it occupied in the seventeenth century to its current 
residence in or around the brain—a bit of a demotion, but still a digniﬁed station.”9 
In that observation, we return to an earlier point:  what Hamlet learns is not that the 
world is a dull, vapid, physical place no longer worthy of us. Rather, his is a radical 
re-vision of just how much we belong to this world, even as we acknowledge the 
value of our being in the world. No romantic despair here. 
Terry Eagleton sees something of the same issues in King Lear, noting, “One 
of the chief doublenesses of this play involves a conﬂict between bodiliness and 
consciousness.”10 Taking a distinctly Marxist turn, he concludes:
If we could divest ourselves of the abstract consciousness which 
comes from blunting the body with a surplus of goods, we would 
be able to feel on our pulses the misery of those dispossessed 
by our wealth, and be moved to shed our superﬂuity by sharing 
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it with them, thus converting an injurious excess into a creative 
one.11 
If this position applies to Lear, what applies to Lear and Hamlet both is that the 
lies of the mind must be confronted for fear that our delusions of grandeur are 
destroying any potential that humanity may have before it.
Consciousness, of course, actually introduced deception into our world at its 
(consciousness’s) inception since it allows us to pursue behavior contrary to our 
beings’ simpler impulses merely to pursue instinctive one-to-one actions. With 
consciousness, we can see and even control our behavior, manipulating it to appear 
contrary to our arguably true feelings/emotions. But ironically it appears that our 
bodies inhere the concept of truth and reality even as our bodies’ consciousnesses 
develop a capacity to have our bodies’ actions “lie.” In The Feeling of What 
Happens, Damasio observes that “voluntary mimicking of expressions of emotion 
is easily detected as fake—something always fails, whether in the conﬁguration of 
the facial muscles or in the tone of voice.”12 In other words, there is a pre-aware 
level of consciousness virtually impossible to control and manipulate. Truth is 
in the body. Damasio, a neuroscientist, does pay particular attention to actors (as 
does Hamlet, of course), masters of manipulation apparently capable of controlling 
their behavior in ways the rest of us can only admire. In many ways, Hamlet is 
the consummate actor, providing us with the supreme test of the body’s reliability 
as a revealer of truth. But the fact that deception is possible does not force us to 
disenfranchise the physical and turn to a parallel universe of disembodied ideas 
in our pursuit of truth. In our world, words often do ﬂy up and thoughts often do 
remain behind; and harlot’s cheeks can be plastered over with seeming virtue. But 
rather than dispense with evidence from the physical world and valorize a world of 
the ideal, our search for truth should instead redouble its efforts to strike through 
masks of deception in the world around us. Individually and collectively, we need 
to perfect observational means and technologies to do exactly what the idealist 
Hamlet mistakenly claims to be capable of doing as the play opens and better 
learns to do as the play progresses:  to distinguish seeming from being through 
close observation of the physical world into which he has been thrust. While in 
their day neither Hamlet nor Shakespeare had twenty-ﬁrst-century science to back 
them up, their impulses are now being validated by current consciousness theory. 
The body tells all, despite our (better or worse) efforts at obfuscation. Curiously, 
Hamlet’s own “Mousetrap” experiment is an early-modern proof of Damasio’s 
assertion. Consciousness can conceal the body’s truth only so far. And what is true 
of Claudius’s efforts at deception is also true ultimately even of Hamlet’s. 
How, then, do we work our way through consciousness back to the body to 
uncover the mind’s lie and reveal the body’s truth? A ﬁrst step is to accept this 
monist paradigm:  there is no need to bridge the dualistically-conceived mind/body 
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chasm since mind and body do not originate from different sources; they are the 
same matter and of the same genesis. And, by extension, we need to recognize that, 
at least to some degree, the deceptive potential of seeming/appearance unmasks 
a certain quality of being itself. Even seeming virtue possesses a certain degree 
of actual virtue.
Once we come to that point of the integrated complexity of materialist self-
conscious awareness, we see a rising need to experiment with the faulty idea of 
mind’s own difference from the world out of which it arose. Dualism is so tantalizing 
because consciousness seems so clearly to be a unique thing. If accurate, dualism 
would have conﬁrmed our connection with our creator, as the early Hamlet seems 
to muse when he speaks the famous words, “What a piece of work is a man, 
how noble in reason, how inﬁnite in faculties . . . . in action how like an angel, 
in apprehension how like a god” (II.ii.300-303). Out of such musing, the illusion 
of dualism is reassuring, creating a curious history of mind’s unique origins in an 
effort to separate it from the rest of physical creation and connecting it to godhead 
itself. That experience of dualism continues to this day.
But we are increasingly recognizing that mind is an interrelated offshoot of 
physical reality, as is consciousness and (probably) soul itself. And what I ﬁnd 
incredible is that Shakespeare, at a time of greatest human conﬁdence in its mental 
potential, sets up an experiment wherein his hero relinquishes his epistemological 
and ontological illusions of superiority and difference. The early Hamlet seems to 
“know” the truth that the world is rotten even before the ghost appears. His prophetic 
soul and all the other less-than-concrete evidence convinces him of Claudius’s 
crime, yet he chooses to wait for concrete evidence. If Hamlet, a man who abhors 
this too, too, solid world, is actually committed to that abhorrence, then material 
evidence is irrelevant. But he is not even sure whether “to be” or “not to be” is the 
preferred condition. Surely, these are not words of a committed idealist. Surely 
Socrates would never have spoken them.
Note that when Hamlet returns from sea, he reﬂects upon Yorick, Alexander, 
and Caesar, speaking of them as if the remains of their too, too solid ﬂesh were as 
materially signiﬁcant as the memories their lives generated. And he declares his 
love for the corpse of Ophelia. It seems the question is no longer “to be or not to 
be” but something like “please let me be” or, later in the play, “how can I continue 
to be after what I have done?” He does ﬁnally kill Claudius, but it seems more the 
result of Laertes bearing concrete witness to Claudius’s intent to murder Hamlet 
than revenge for the murder of the elder Hamlet, oddly missing throughout these 
last acts. Being is preferred to not being.
In the end, Hamlet gives up efforts to manipulate the world and control its 
destiny; rather, the world grabs Hamlet and takes control of his destiny. In the 
end, Hamlet’s struggle signals neither the triumph of an ideal mind or real world 
beyond that mind (though Fortinbras does appear to usher in a return to dualism, 
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with the material world becoming ascendant). Hamlet’s faded struggle signals a 
call for a recognition of the interrelationship of the ideal and real, suggesting a 
real-to-ideal genealogy that reverses the Platonic-Judeo-Christian tradition. Namely 
Shakespeare suggests that the physical precedes the ideal and deserves exactly the 
attention theatre gives it. 
The theatre—and Shakespeare and Hamlet—kicks the stone that invalidates 
the idea that idealism is derived from stuff other than that which makes stones 
themselves. Taking up the bodies is the stage’s ﬁnal action. Finally, even more 
than Dr. Johnson’s perhaps apocryphal stone, bodies are the stuff dreams and 
minds and souls are made on, whose airy nothings were just moments ago earthly 
everythings without which even the great globe itself would not be so much as 
a memory. We may never know with certainty that a certain appearance reveals 
true being—at least not in the manner we like to think of true being (unpolluted 
by false appearance)—because that appearance is itself part of the truth. Surely, 
relying on an “I-give-up-on-the-real-world” brand of abstract idealism is not the 
way to pursue the true.
What do we learn from all of this? (1) That the opposite of the “ideal” is not 
the “real” because the two are ultimately inseparable. (2) That the opposite of mind, 
consciousness, spirit, soul is not the physical world of brain, neural networks, and 
reﬂexes, but are actually integrated outgrowths of each. (3) That appearance and 
seeming are not the opposite of reality and being but are some vital and mutually 
valid descriptors of reality itself. (4) That the opposite of the “real” is not the 
“theatre”; rather, that theatre is very much part of the real in ways that are becoming 
daily more clearly manifest in theatre, self-conscious expression on the stage, 
and in the sciences themselves, thanks to advances in consciousness theory. If we 
can learn these points—almost literally down into our marrow—then we will be 
better able to pursue truth through channels that can best reveal what we seek. As 
Damasio notes, it is a “difﬁcult and indispensable job indeed, but one without which 
we will be far better off leaving Descartes’ Error uncorrected”13 Finally, one can 
only wonder what the modern/contemporary world would be like—at least what 
the current state of intellectual thought would be like—if Descartes had regularly 
attended the theatre before he presented his philosophy to the world.
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